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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Askew argued that the Idaho Supreme Court denied
him due process and equal protection when it denied his Motion to Augment the record
on appeal with various transcripts. Mr. Askew argues that the requested transcripts are
necessary for his appeal because the district court could utilize its own memory of the
prior proceedings when it executed a sentence after revoking probation. In response,
the State argues that the requested transcripts are not relevant because the district
court did not expressly rely on the transcripts because they were not before it when it
denied Mr. Askew's Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion requesting
leniency. Additionally, the State argued that the requested transcripts are not relevant
under a new standard of review articulated in State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618 (Ct. App.
2012).

This brief is necessary to address the Morgan opinion and the State's assertion
that the requested transcripts are not relevant to the issues on appeal. (Respondent's
Brief, pp.4-14.) This brief is also necessary to withdraw the second issue raised in the
Appellant's Brief.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Askew's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES
1.

Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Askew due process and equal protection
when it denied his motion to augment the appellate record with the requested
transcripts?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction? 1

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Askew's Rule 35
motion requesting leniency in light of the mitigating factors present in this
matter? 2

The State accurately pointed out that Mr. Askew did not file his Rule 35 motion within
fourteen days of the order relinquishing jurisdiction. As such, this appeal is only timely
from the order denying Mr. Askew's Rule 35 motion. Accordingly, Mr. Askew is
withdrawing Issue II from this Court's consideration.
2 This Brief will not address Issue 111.
1
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ARGUMENT
I.
The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Askew Due Process And Equal Protection When
It Denied His Motion To Augment The Appellate Record With Necessary Transcripts

A.

Introduction
In Idaho, district courts consider a broad range of information when making

sentencing decisions.

Due to this broad range of information considered, Idaho

appellate courts have scrupulously required defendants to provide an extensive
appellate record because they conduct an independent review of the entire record
before the district court when determining whether an abuse of discretion occurred in
regard to a sentencing determination. In other words, the question on appeal generally
does not focus on how or what the district court actually considered.

Instead, the

central question is whether the record before the district court supports its sentencing
determination.
Since Idaho appellate courts need to have all of the relevant information that was
before the district court to conduct this analysis, they will presume that any missing
information supports the trial court's determination and refuse to rule on the merits of
the issue. In some instances, the Court of Appeals has refused to address the merits of
issues on appeal due to the appellants' failure to provide transcripts of hearings which
were never discussed by the district court and occurred years before the disposition of
the issue on appeal.
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B.

In The Event This Case Is Assigned To The Court Of Appeals, The Court Has
The Authority To Address The Issues Raised In The Appellant's Brief

1.

The Idaho Rules Of Appellate Procedure Require The Idaho Court Of
Appeals To Address The Issues Raised In Mr. Askew's Appeal

In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Askew argued, for the first time in this appeal, that
the denial of his request for the transcripts violated the Fourteenth Amendment's due
process and equal protections clauses. (Appellant's Brief, pp.4-16.) In State v. Morgan,
153 Idaho 618 (Ct. App. 2012), the Court of Appeals held that it did not have the
authority to address a substantially similar due process argument because it would be
tantamount to entertaining an appeal from the Supreme Court. Contrary to the Morgan
Opinion, Idaho Appellate Rule 108 requires the Court of Appeals to rule on the merits of
all cases to which it is assigned by the Supreme Court. The relevant portions of I.AR.
108 state as follows:
Cases Reserved to Supreme Court. The Court of Appeals shall hear and
decide all cases assigned to it by the Supreme Court; provided that the
Supreme Court will not assign the following cases:
(1) Proceedings invoking the original jurisdiction of the Idaho
Supreme Court;
(2) Appeals from imposition of sentences of capital punishment in
criminal cases;
(3) Appeals from the Industrial Commission;
(4) Appeals from the Public Utilities Commission;
(5) Review of the recommendatory orders of the Board of
Commissioners of the Idaho State Bar;
(6) Review of recommendatory orders of the Judicial Council.

4

(emphasis added). Since the issues raised in his Appellant's Brief do not fall into any of
the foregoing categories, the Idaho Court of Appeals has the authority to address the
issues raised in his Appellant's Brief.
Further, an assignment of this case to the Court of Appeals functions as an
implicit grant of authority from the Idaho Supreme Court to review Mr. Askew's claims
about the constitutionality of the merits of its decision to deny his request for the
transcripts. The Supreme Court will be aware of Mr. Askew's due process issue when it
makes it decision to either keep this appeal of assign it to the Court of Appeals. This
position is bolstered by the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court. Specifically, I.R.S.C.
21, which governs the assignment of cases. The language of I.R.S.C. 21 follows:
Assignment of Cases. The chief justice (or designee) shall make the
tentative assignment of cases as between the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals. Copies of each assignment sheet shall be given to the
justices, affording each an opportunity to object and request the Court to
reconsider the assignment.

Any objection to the assignment shall be stated, with reasons, in writing
and circulated to all the justices.

At the request of any justice, the objection to the assignment shall be
taken up at conference.
The assignment of cases is not an arbitrary process; according to the rule, it is a
deliberate process which affords all the justices the ability to object and provide input
into the decision to assign a case to the Court of Appeals.

Therefore, the Supreme

Court will be aware of Mr. Askew's due process and equal protection arguments when it
makes the decision to either keep this case or assign this case to the Court of Appeals.
In the event this case is assigned to the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court will be
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implicitly granting the court authority to address the merits of Mr. Askew's claims of
error.
Additionally, the Morgan Court indicated that Morgan should file a renewed
motion to augment the record with the Court of Appeals after his appeal was assigned
to the Court of Appeals. Morgan, 153 Idaho at 621-622. This assertion is without merit
because the Idaho Appellate Rules require all motions to be filed with the Idaho
Supreme Court. For example, Idaho Appellate Rule 110 states as follows:
All motions, petitions, briefs and other appellate documents, other than the
initial notice of appeal, shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court
as required by the Idaho Appellate Rules with the court heading of the
Supreme Court of the State of Idaho as provided by Rule 6. There shall be
no separate filings directed to or filed with the Court of Appeals. In the
event of an assignment of a case to the Court of Appeals, the title of the
proceeding and the identifying number thereof shall not be changed
except that the Clerk of the Supreme Court may add additional letters or
other notations to the case number so as to identify the assignment of the
case. All case files shall be maintained in the office of the Clerk of the
Supreme Court.
(emphasis added).

Furthermore, Idaho Appellate Rule 30 requires that all motions to

augment be filed with the Supreme Court. The relevant portions of I.AR. 30 follow:
Any party may move the Supreme Court to augment or delete from the
settled reporter's transcript or clerk's or agency's record.

Unless otherwise expressly ordered by the Supreme Court such motion
shall be determined without oral argument. The reporter's transcript and
clerk's or agency's record may also be augmented or portions deleted by
stipulation of the parties and order of the Supreme Court.
(emphasis added). Mr. Askew is not aware of any court rule which allows a party to an
appeal to file a motion directly with the Court of Appeals.

Idaho Appellate Rule 11 0

expressly prohibits such filings. Therefore, the State's contention that Mr. Askew could
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have filed a renewed motion to augment directly with the Court of Appeals is contrary to
the Idaho Appellate Rules.
In sum, when the Idaho Supreme Court assigns an appeal to the Idaho Court of
Appeals, the Idaho Appellate Rules require the Court of Appeals to decide all issues
addressed in that appeal. Even though Mr. Askew is challenging the constitutionality of
the Supreme Court's decision to deny his request for the transcripts, an assignment of
this case to the Court of Appeals functions as an implicit grant of authority from the
Idaho Supreme Court to review all issues raised in the Appellant's Brief.

2.

An Assignment Of This Case to An Appellate Tribunal With No Authority
To Address Mr. Askew's Claims Of Error Will Violate His Right To
Procedural Due Process On Appeal

In the event the Idaho Supreme Court assigns this case to the Court of Appeals
and it determines that the Court of Appeals does not have the authority to address all of
the issues Mr. Askew raised in his Appellant's Brief, he argues, in the alternative, that
will function as a separate denial of his federal due process rights, which guarantee him
a fair appeal. The Constitutions of both United States and the State of Idaho guarantee
a criminal defendant due process of law. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; ID. CONST. art.
I §13.
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965);
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair."
Lassiterv. Department of Soc. Serv. of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24
(1981).
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State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 445 ( 1991) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Wood,
132 Idaho 88 (1998)). Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United
States Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United
States Constitution to art. I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh v. State, 132
Idaho 221, 227 (1998) (citing Smith v. Idaho Dept. of Correction, 128 Idaho 768, 771
(1996)).
While there is no federal guarantee to an appeal from criminal state court
proceedings, after a state decides to provide appellate review, the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment are applicable during the
entirety of the appellate proceedings. Griffin v. Illinois 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956). In Idaho,
a criminal defendant's right to appeal is created by statute. See I.C. § 19-2801.
Additionally, an appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion is an appeal of right as
defined in Idaho Appellate Rule 11 (9).

See State v. Fuller, 104 Idaho 891 (Ct. App.

1983) (an order denying a motion for reduction of sentence under a Rule 35 is an
appealable order pursuant to I.AR. 11 (c)(6)).
In this case, Mr. Askew argues that due process protections apply to every stage
of his appeal. Those protections apply to any appellate procedural decision made by
the Idaho Supreme Court. Even though Mr. Askew does not have an independent right
to appeal from the order denying his motion to augment, he can challenge the
constitutionality of the order because it is a procedural component of his appeal and
the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause applies to all procedures affecting his
appeal. If the Idaho Supreme Court assigns this appeal to the Idaho Court of Appeals,
knowing that the Court of Appeals had no authority to reverse an order of the Supreme
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Court, a unique and independent procedural due process violation will occur because
the Supreme Court will have precluded Mr. Askew from any state procedure by which
he could raise his federal constitutional claims challenging the denial of his motion to
augment.

C.

The New Standard Of Review Articulated in Morgan Is lnapposite As It Did Not
Alter The Standard Of Review Applicable When An Appellant Challenges The
Length Of A Sentence Which Is Executed After The Revocation Of Probation
The State argues that the requested transcripts are not necessary for this appeal

in reliance on the new standard of review articulated in Morgan. (Respondent's Brief,
p.9 n2.) However, the Morgan standard of review is only applicable to the question of
whether probation should be revoked and not to the question of what sentence should
be executed after probation is revoked.

State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26 (Ct. App.

2009) made it clear what standard of review is applicable when the question on appeal
is what the appropriate sentence should be after probation is revoked.

Morgan is

inapposite as Mr. Askew is challenging the length of his sentence on appeal.
The Court of Appeals' standard of review which is relevant to the length of a
sentence which is executed following the revocation of probation was articulated in

Hanington. In that case, the Idaho Court of Appeals resolved an ongoing dispute about
the proper standard of review in probation revocation cases.

Id. at 27.

Relying on

State v. Chacon, 146 Idaho 520, 524-25 (Ct. App. 2008), and State v. Coffin, 122 Idaho
392 (Ct. App. 1992), the State sought to limit review to only facts that had arisen
between the original pronouncement of the sentence and the revocation proceedings.

Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28. Essentially, the State's position would have eliminated any
need appellate review of any evidence, argument, or factor obtained by the district court
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prior to the probation revocation proceedings at issue.

Hanington argued that the

proper standard of review should include a review of "all facts existing both at the time
of the original sentence and at the time the sentence is ordered into execution," relying
on the standard established in State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1055-1056 (Ct. App.
1989). Id. at 27. The Court of Appeals agreed with Hanington and stated:
The State has read our somewhat differing versions of the scope of review
too restrictively. We have not intended to suggest that our review is limited
solely to events occurring between the original imposition of sentence and
the decision to order the sentence into execution. When we review a
sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of probation, we
will examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the
original judgment. We base our review upon the facts existing when the
sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original
sentencing and the revocation of probation.
Id.

The Hanington Court made it clear that when determining what sentence to
execute, the appellate court would review the entire record, including the factors at the
original sentencing hearing through the probation revocation before the court on appeal.
The rationale behind this clarification makes perfect sense when looking once again to
State v. Adams, the decision that explained why the· appellate courts should look to the
entire record when reviewing the executed sentence:
[W]hen we review a sentence ordered into execution after probation has
been revoked, we examine the entire record encompassing events before
and after the original judgment. We adopt this scope of review for two
reasons. First, the district judge, when deciding whether to order execution
of the original sentence or of a reduced sentence, does not artificially
segregate the facts into prejudgment and postjudgment categories. The
judge naturally and quite properly remembers the entire course of events
and considers all relevant facts in reaching a decision. When reviewing
that decision, we should consider the same facts. Second, when a
sentence is suspended and probation is granted, the defendant has scant
reason, and no incentive, to appeal. Only if the probation is later revoked,
and the sentence is ordered into execution, does the issue of an
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excessive sentence become genuinely meaningful. Were we to adopt the
state's position that any claim of excessiveness is waived if not made on
immediate appeal from the judgment pronouncing but suspending a
sentence, defendants would be forced to file preventive appeals as a
hedge against the risk that probation someday might be revoked. We see
no reason to compel this hollow exercise. Neither do we wish to see the
appellate system cluttered with such cases.
Adams, 115 Idaho at 1055-56. As such, when an appellant files an appeal from an

order revoking probation and challenges the length of his/her sentence, the applicable
standard of review requires an independent and comprehensive inquiry to the events
which occurred prior to as well as the events which occurred during the probation
revocation proceedings. The basis for this standard of review is that the judge "naturally
and quite properly remembers the entire course of events and considers all relevant
facts in reaching a decision." Id.

Based on that presumption, the Court of Appeals

stated that, "When reviewing that decision, we should consider the same facts."

Id.

The Court of Appeals did not state that the district court must expressly reference the
prejudgment events at the probation disposition hearing in order for this standard of
review to become applicable. To the contrary, the Court of Appeals assumed the judge
will automatically consider the prejudgment events when determining whether the
district court abused its discretion when executing a sentence after probation was
revoked.
The State also argues that the requested transcripts were never presented to the
district court and were, therefore, never part of the record before the district court and
are not properly considered for the first time on appeal. (Respondent's Brief, pp. 7-8.)
Contrary to the State's position, the question of whether the transcript of the requested
proceeding was before the district court at the time of the probation violation disposition
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hearing is not relevant in deciding whether the transcript is relevant to the issues on
appeal. That is because, in reaching a sentencing or probation decision, a district court
is not limited to considering only that information offered at the proceeding from which
the appeal is filed. Rather, a court is entitled to utilize knowledge gained from its own
official position and observations. Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 373-74 (Ct. App.
2001 ); see also State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 907 (1983) (recognizing that the findings
of the trial judge in sentencing are based, in part, upon what the court heard during the
trial); State v. Wallace, 98 Idaho 318 (1977) (recognizing that the court could rely upon
"the number of certain types of criminal transactions that [the judge] has observed in the
courts within his judicial district and the quantity of drugs therein involved"); State v.
Gibson, 106 Idaho 491 (Ct. App. 1984) (approving sentencing court's reliance upon
evidence presented at the preliminary hearing from a previously dismissed case
because "the judge hardly could be expected to disregard what he already knew about
Gibson from the other case"). Thus, whether the prior hearing was transcribed or not is
irrelevant, because the district court could rely upon the information it already knew from
presiding over the hearings at issue. Moreover, in Adams, supra, the Court of Appeals
presumed that the district court would rely upon such information.
Additionally, the State's position is unworkable because all transcripts, except a
transcript of the hearing from which an appeal is taken, would be deemed new
information. This is inconsistent with the holding from State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271,
276 (Ct. App. 2000), where the district court examined the defendant about his guilty
plea during the change of plea hearing. Since the defendant in Burdett failed to provide
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a transcript of that hearing on appeal, the Court of Appeals presumed that something
occurred in that hearing which supported the district court's sentencing decision. Id.
If the State's argument is taken to its logical conclusion, a transcript of a
defendant's original sentencing hearing would be new information in instances where an
appeal is filed from a Rule 35 motion requesting leniency.

Further, if that is new

information, a district court should not, absent a transcript, consider what happened at
sentencing when evaluating a Rule 35 motion. However, in State v. Wright, 114 Idaho
451, 452-453 (Ct. App. 1988), the Idaho Court of Appeals refused to address the merits
of an appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion because the appellant failed to provide
the Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI) and a transcript of the
sentencing hearing in the appellate record. See also State v. Rundle, 107 Idaho 936
(Ct. App. 1984).
After arguing that the unprepared transcripts would constitute new information on
the appeal, the State contradicts itself and relies on the transcript of original sentencing
hearing in the substance of the Rule 35 argument.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.18-21.)

Specifically, the State pointed out that the district court had already considered both the
aggravating and mitigating evidence when it decided to place Mr. Askew on probation.
(Respondent's Brief, p.18 (citing Tr., p.16, L.1 - p.23, L.14).) The State then relied on
the transcript of the original sentencing hearing to argue that some of the information
Mr. Askew used in support of his Rule 35 motion was not new. (Respondent's Brief,
p.19 (citing Tr., p.19, L.24- p.20, L.3, p.17, L.16- p.23, L.2).) If the State's argument is
correct and then transcript of the original sentencing hearing, which was created after
the notice of appeal was filed (R., pp.208, 212), is new information and inappropriate for
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appellate review, the State's use of the transcript of the original sentencing hearing is
also inappropriate because it constitutes reliance on new information not in the district
court's record. The State's contradictory arguments highlight the absurdity of its narrow
interpretation of the applicable standard of review.
According to the State, Mr. Askew argued, "with no citation whatsoever," due
process and equal protection require the State to provide him (and all indigent
defendants) with an appellate record unless some or all of the requested materials are
unnecessary or frivolous.

(Respondent's Brief, p.10.) As an initial point, the State's

characterization of Mr. Askew's position is misleading because it omits the fact that
Mr. Askew recognized that a colorable need for the requested transcript must exist
before it becomes the State's burden to prove the requested transcript is irrelevant.
See Appellant's Brief, p.5 ("In the event the record reflects a colorable need for a
transcript, the only way a court can constitutionally preclude an indigent defendant from
obtaining that transcript is if the State can prove that the transcript is irrelevant to the
issues raised on appeal.").
Mr. Askew's burden shifting argument was based on Mayer v. City of Chicago,
404 U.S. 189, 195 (1971), where the United States Supreme Court first held that the
State does not need to "waste its funds by providing what is unnecessary for adequate
appellate review." However, the Court went on to hold that:
We emphasize, however, that the State must provide a full verbatim
record where that is necessary to assure the indigent as effective an
appeal as would be available to the defendant with resources to pay his
own way. Moreover, where the grounds of appeal, as in this case, make
out a colorable need for a complete transcript, the burden is on the State
to show that only a portion of the transcript or an 'alternative' will suffice
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for an effective appeal on those grounds. This rationale underlies our
statement in Draper, 3 that:
'(T)he State could have endeavored to show that a narrative
statement or only a portion of the transcript would be adequate and
available for appellate consideration of petitioners' contentions. The
trial judge would have complied with * * * the constitutional mandate
* * * in limiting the grant accordingly on the basis of such a showing
by the State. '4
Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). If it is apparent on the record that there is a

colorable need for the requested transcripts, it is the State's burden to prove that the
requested transcripts are irrelevant.

Further, the Mayer Court never stated it is the

defendant's burden to prove a colorable need for the requested transcript. Instead, it
held that if the grounds for appeal make out a colorable need for the transcript then the
burden shifts to the State. Therefore, Mr. Askew's burden shifting position is supported
by the case law referenced by the State.
Based on the Mayer Opinion, the State also argues that Mr. Askew has failed to
make the requisite showing that the requested transcripts are relevant to the issues on
appeal.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.9-12.)

Specifically, the State cites to the Mayer

Opinion for the proposition "that, absent a showing that evidence was presented at prior

3

4

Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 498 (1963).
While addressing the State's argument the Mayer Court also noted that:

[This analysis does not include a] balance between the needs of the
accused and the interests of society; its principle is a flat prohibition
against pricing indigent defendants out of as effective an appeal as would
be available to others able to pay their own way. The invidiousness of the
discrimination that exists when criminal procedures are made available
only to those who can pay is not erased by any differences in the
sentences that may be imposed. The State's fiscal interest is, therefore,
irrelevant.
Mayer, 404 U.S. at 196-197.
15

hearings, and that the district court relied on such evidence in reaching its decision to
revoke probation, an appellant is not entitled to a transcription at public expense .... "
(Respondent's Brief, p.6 (original emphasis).) The State then argues that Mr. Askew
has failed to show that the district court relied on anything that occurred during the
hearing at issue when the district court revoked her probation.

(Respondent's Brief,

pp.6-8.) The State's position is flawed because it assumes that it is Mr. Askew's burden
to establish the relevance of the transcript, a proposition, which is not support by the
Mayer opinion.
The State's position is also flawed because it engrafts its definition of relevance
into the holding from Mayer and then confuses the applicable standard or review. First,

Mayer only requires that the State provide an indigent defendant access to transcripts if
they are generally relevant to an issue on appeal.

That opinion does not attempt to

define relevance. It never holds, as the state suggests that a transcript is relevant only
if evidence was adduced at a hearing or if the district court relied on the hearing at issue
when revoking probation.

As argued above, the requested transcripts are relevant

because of the applicable standard of review.
In sum, the Morgan Opinion only dealt with an appeal challenge the district
court's decision to revoke probation. Hanington still controls the applicable standard of
review when a sentence is challenged after probation is revoked.

As such, the

requested transcript is relevant to the sentencing issue raised on appeal, and lack of
access to that transcript will prevent Mr. Askew from a merits based review of his
sentencing issue.
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CONCLUSION
Appellate counsel respectfully requests access to the requested transcripts and
the opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which
arise as a result of that review.

In the event this request is denied, Mr. Askew

respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence to a unified sentence of seven
years, with one and one-half years fixed.
DATED this 23 rd day of January, 2013.

SHAWN F. WILKERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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